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Abstract 
 
It is often held that the establishment of electoral democracy is key to the creation of 
political legitimacy. This article challenges this idea and presents an alternative. A 
large number of empirical studies reveals that electoral democracy has no necessary 
implications for the establishment of legitimacy. Even in the successful and stable 
Nordic democracies, there is scant evidence that legitimacy is created on the input 
side of the political system. For example political legitimacy in the former Yugoslavia 
broke down not because ethnic groups realized they would become permanent 
minorities, but because the new Croatian state violated citizens’ rights to the exercise 
of power. Legitimacy turns out to be created, maintained and destroyed not at the 
input but at the output side of the political system. Hence political legitimacy depends 
at least as much on the quality of government than on the capacity of electoral 
systems to create effective representation. 
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Creating Political Legitimacy: Electoral Democracy versus Quality of 
Government 
 
 
 “BE NICE TO AMERICA….. or we’ll bring democracy to your country!” 
 
Driving around my hometown Gothenburg in West Sweden, one can occasionally spot cars 
with a red bumper sticker with the above sentence written on it.1 Behind this amusing slogan 
is the now widespread recognition that the Bush Administration’s efforts to create a legitimate 
political authority in Iraq by introducing electoral mass democracy have failed miserably. 
Even though the Iraqi people have cast their votes several times in surprisingly large numbers, 
and even though the elections were carried out in a reasonably orderly and – at least for this 
part of the world -- surprisingly fair manner, the Iraqi government has been unable to 
establish itself as the legitimate political authority in the country. In his Address to the Nation 
on December 18, 2005, George W. Bush stated the following:  
Three days ago, in large numbers, Iraqis went to the polls to choose their 
own leaders -- a landmark day in the history of liberty. In the coming 
weeks, the ballots will be counted, a new government formed, and a 
people who suffered in tyranny for so long will become full members of 
the free world.2
  To put it mildly, things did not develop as the current U.S. administration and its intellectual 
entourage had predicted (Plesch 2005). Enabling the Iraqi people to vote and thereby to 
choose who is going to wield political authority over them has hardly created political 
legitimacy (Rangwala 2005). Yet this failure seems to have come as a big surprise (cf. Frum 
and Perle 2003). Why should people turn to violent protests when they have ousted a brutal 
dictator and now have a government that they have elected? In a so-called fact sheet titled 
“Democracy in Iraq”, issued on December 12, 2005, the White House stated that:  
Two and a half years ago, Iraq was in the grip of a cruel dictator. Since 
then, Iraqis have assumed sovereignty of their country, held free elections, 
drafted a democratic constitution, and approved that constitution in a 
nationwide referendum. In three days, they will go to the polls for the third 
                                                 
1See http://www.stickergiant.com/, click “social-political”, “progressive” and “anti-Bush”.  
2 http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/12/20051218-2.html 
 
 time this year and choose a new government under their new constitution. 
Difficult work remains, but 2005 will be recorded as a turning point in the 
history of Iraq, the Middle East, and freedom.3
The Bush Administration was hardly alone in thinking that democratic elections resulting in 
rule by a majority create political legitimacy. Indeed, this view idea seems to be taken for 
granted in the scholarly literature as well as by leading international organizations (Goodwin-
Gill 2006). The liberal Danish Prime Minister, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, recently made the 
following comment when the Danish troops returned home from Iraq:  
What we aimed at the Iraqi people also got.  We were successful in 
carrying out to referendums about a new constitution and a democratic 
election for a government that everyone has recognized as free and fair. 
But I have honestly to admit that I underestimated the strength of religious 
fanaticism that fight against freedom and democracy. Like many other 
westerners I believed that that demand for democracy and freedom was so 
universal and strong among all kinds of people, that the foreign troops 
would be received with open arms as liberators.4  
The view that democratic elections are an effective way of creating political 
legitimacy has not only been criticized in the aftermath of the Iraq war; it has also been 
questioned in other conflict-ridden areas such as the Balkans (Ragaru 2003). As are most 
central concepts in social science, political legitimacy is important, problematic and difficult 
to define. Four distinct views about the attainment of legitimacy are found in the literature. 
People may accept the political authority of leaders in their country due to (a) tradition, (b) 
the personal appeal of the leaders (charisma), (c) the government’s production of goods and 
services or (d) belief in the fairness of the procedural mechanisms responsible for selecting 
leaders (Beetham 1991).   
I will have nothing to say about the two first points in this paper. Point (c) is 
interesting because it comes in two forms. One is that a government can achieve political 
legitimacy because it serves some notion of the common interest in coordinating citizens’ 
activities in a socially beneficial way. This enables it to gain acceptance for its policies from a 
large proportion of the population (Przeworski, Stokes, and Manin:1999). Alternatively, it can 
obtain legitimacy by receiving support from a just large enough part of the population (e.g., a 
narrow majority), or a segment of powerful interest groups, by giving these groups special 
                                                 
3 http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/12/20051212-1.html 
4 Danish daily newspaper Politiken, August 9, 2007, my translation.  
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 favor at the expense of the common good (Zakaria  2003). The problem here is that many 
other groups in society are unable to press for their own interests because they cannot 
overcome obstacles to collective action (e.g. consumers, the unemployed). This latter type of 
legitimacy is usually considered to result from patronage or neo-corporatism; it will not 
feature strongly in the following analysis. 
The last and  -- for present purposes -- most important point is usually understood as a 
process in which legitimacy is attained by the enactment of procedural constitutional 
representative democracy. On this view, people will accept a political authority because they 
have been given the right to take part in free and fair elections, resulting in a government that 
represents the majority of citizens. This constitutes “the essence of democracy: rule of the 
people by the people” (Lindberg 2006: 1). As formulated by Bernhard Manin (1997: 33), 
“identity between the will of the representatives and the will of the people is secured through 
formal legal provisions” constituting some variant of representative democracy. Those who 
are not part of the majority will still perceive the system as legitimate because they stand a 
fair chance of becoming the majority in the next election. This procedural package comes 
with a bundle of other rights for articulating interests, such as the right to stand for office, the 
right to organize, freedom of expression, and so forth (Dahl 1989).  
This article challenges this widely-held idea that electoral democracy is the key for 
the creation of political legitimacy, and presents an alternative. Needless to say, this is not a 
critique of electoral democracy as such, which I take as an indispensable part of a legitimate 
political system, but an argument against the idea that it can serve as the main pillar for 
creating political legitimacy. I argue that electoral democracy is highly overrated when it 
comes to creating legitimacy. On the contrary, legitimacy is created, maintained and 
destroyed not by the input but by at the output side of the political system. In brief, political 
legitimacy depends on the quality of government, not on the quality of elections or political 
representation. As elaborated below, the normative basis for the quality of government is its 
impartiality (Rothstein and Teorell 2008).  
If the prominent political theorist Robert Dahl is correct in holding that political 
equality is the basic legitimate norm that guides access to power in a democracy, what then 
makes the exercise of political power legitimate? Elsewhere, I have argued that this norm is 
procedural fairness based on impartiality (Rothstein and Teorell 2008). What do we mean by 
impartiality in the exercise of public power? When implementing laws and policies, 
government officials shall not take anything into consideration about the citizen/case that is 
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 not beforehand stipulated in the policy or the law (cf. Strömberg 2000).5 As Cupit (2000) 
writes: “To act impartially is to be unmoved by certain sorts of considerations -- such as 
special relationships and personal preferences. It is to treat people alike irrespective of 
personal relationships and personal likes and dislikes.”  
This sounds very similar to the rule-of-law principle, which for long has been seen as 
a legitimacy-enhancing feature of any government. However, whereas impartiality is central 
to the rule of law, the norm of impartiality is broader because it applies to other spheres of 
state action other than those directly governed by law. When public policy is enacted in so-
called human processing area -- such as education, health care, social welfare, and active 
labor-market programs -- widely discretionary powers usually need to be transferred to lower-
level government officials responsible for implementing policy. Impartial, non-discriminatory 
behavior on behalf of these policy enactments is of course a key virtue according to this 
theory. But it falls outside the sphere of government activity regulated by the rule of law. In 
other words, quality of government based on the impartiality principle encompasses and goes 
beyond the rule of law in incorporating other important forms of government actions which 
may be as important for creating political legitimacy (Rothstein and Teorell, 2008) 
 
Does electoral democracy promote political legitimacy? 
 
As stated above, the idea that electoral democracy is the key to political legitimacy is usually 
taken for granted (Goodwin-Gill: 2006). For example, when Guillermo O’Donnell (one of the 
most prominent scholars in this field of research) received the first Lifetime Achievement 
Award in 2006 for the advancement of political science from the International Political 
Science Association, he stated in his keynote speech that “across most of the globe today, the 
ultimate claim of a political regime to be legitimate -- or at least acceptable -- rests on the 
kind of popular consent that purportedly finds expression in the act of free voting” (O'Donnell 
2007: 6). Likewise, as the political philosopher Allen Buchanan puts it, 
According to what may be the most plausible versions of democratic 
theory, the inequality that political power inevitably involves is justifiable 
                                                 
5 It should be stressed that this definition does not imply that no other concerns than those stipulated beforehand 
by law should be taken into consideration when settling a case. Time or budget constraints would be perfectly 
legitimate concerns, even though they are rarely mentioned by laws or specific policies. Rather, what this 
definition implies is that no other characteristic of the citizen or the case to be dealt with – other than those 
stipulated in the policy or law – should be taken into consideration. 
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 if every citizen has "an equal say" in determining who will wield the 
power and how it will be wielded (Buchanan 2002: 699) 
There seem to be three ideas behind this claim. One is that free voting is based on the 
principle of political equality, which is the basic norm that renders legitimacy to a political 
authority (Dahl 2006). While most democracies place restrictions on the right to vote (young 
people, prisoners, and the mentally ill may be excluded), and quite a few ban certain types of 
(extremist) parties and political expressions (Issacharoff 2007), political equality that 
translates into “one citizen one vote” can be seen as a signal that the state treats all citizens 
with equal concern and respect (Dworkin 1977). This sign of respect may of course in itself 
create a form of legitimacy.  
The second argument is that numbers count, and at the end of the day the majority 
should have its way in decisions about public policies. Third, electoral democracy provides 
losers with the hope that the next time around they may stand a new chance of becoming 
winners (O'Donnell 2007). All three arguments rest on the view that legitimacy is created on 
the input side of the political system – that is, it results from an effective form of interest 
articulation. Electoral democracy offers at least some approximation of the realization of the 
will of the people (Esaiassion 2003). In article 21 in the United Nations Declaration of Human 
Rights, this is stated as follows:  
The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government; this 
will shall be expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be by 
universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret vote or by 
equivalent free voting procedures. 
Can something like the Rousseauian will of the people be said to exist? How can we 
distinguish between sudden changes of popular opinion and what is the long-term interest of 
the people? Consider a society dominated by strong clan-based loyalties where it is customary 
for officials to appropriate public funds for the well-being of their clan. If most citizens 
believed that members of the other clans would refrain from such practices when they were in 
office, then they would be willing to scrap this clan based system and replace it with a more 
universal alternative (cf. Mungiu-Pippidi: 2006). Since most clan leaders and members do not 
believe that the other clans would honor such an agreement, the system is stuck in a corrupt 
equilibrium. Determining the will of the people is in a situation like this is impossible.  
Let me offer another example. In 1955 a referendum was held in Sweden to determine 
if driving should be on the left or right side of the road. All neighboring countries had already 
changed, or decided to change, to right-hand side driving (and Volvo and Saab only produced 
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 cars for right-hand side driving!) so the argument for a change was pretty straightforward. 
Nevertheless, 82.9 percent voted in favor of keeping left-hand side driving and only 15.3 
percent voted for a change. However, in 1963 the Swedish Parliament decided that the 
country should switch. Once the change was carried out, it received massive popular support. 
I would guess that, if asked, 99 percent of Swedes would say that this was one of the wisest 
decisions that their political representatives have ever made. In cases like this (and they are 
many) it is actually very hard to determine what the will of the people consists of. Although 
the Swedish universal day-care/pre-school system is very much the pride of the nation for 
strengthening gender equality today, it had very little popular support when it was launched in 
the early 1970s (Westerståhl and Johansson: 1985).  
Another common critique of the will of the people theory is that even in a well-
established democracy, political leaders or other elites often have the resources required to 
manufacture whatever will of the people they happen to desire (Esaiassion 2003; Brady this 
volume). While I agree with Gerry Mackie (2003) and Donald Wittman (1995) that the social 
choice critique of electoral democracy is one of the most overblown discussions ever to have 
taken place in the social sciences, arguments for electoral democracy have other weaknesses, 
as well.  
A particularly interesting example of these weaknesses can be found in present-day 
Norway. In the 1990s, the Norwegian government, like its Scandinavian counterparts, 
organized a mega social science research project designed to analyze how well the country’s 
democracy functions. This research program was led by three political scientists, one 
sociologist, and a specialist in cultural studies and engaged over a hundred scholars from 
many other disciplines, including law and the humanities. Studies about almost every aspect 
of Norwegian democracy were carried out between 1998 and 2003, and culminated in a final 
report. To put it mildly, this report gives a very bleak picture of the present quality of 
democracy in Norway. This report concludes that: 
The parliamentary chain of government is weakened in every link; parties 
and elections are less mobilizing; minority governments imply that the 
connection between election results and policy formation is broken; and 
elected assemblies have been suffering a notable loss of domain (Østerud 
and Selle: 2006). 
It also points to other ways in which Norwegian representative democracy had eroded over 
the course of the study: parliament had lost power to market forces, the mass media had 
become more dominated by the logic of the market, parties and major nation-wide interest 
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 organizations functioned less well and recruited fewer members and activists (Selle & 
Østerud, 2006).6  
The entire research program was premised on the belief that electoral democracy 
creates legitimacy (Tranvik and Selle: 2003). The program’s empirical studies -- on almost 
every conceivable aspect of the workings of Norwegian democracy -- were evaluated against 
this normative ideal (described as the “parliamentary chain of government” (cf. Olsen: 1992) 
starting with the voters and ending with the political decisions that are actually implemented 
(Christiansen and Togeby, 2006).      
In his thoughtful (and positive) review of this report, Stein Ringen (2004) made a 
poignant comment. While he did not disagree with the report’s many criticisms of the 
workings of Norwegian democracy, he pointed out an intriguing irony. Norway is an 
extremely rich country with a highly educated electorate. The income from the North Sea oil 
creates an almost unmanageable budget surplus for the government. For many years the 
country has been peaceful, lacking in major social conflicts. Norway has a long popular 
democratic tradition going back to at least 1814 when the constitution was created. Further, 
this is a country with a very generous welfare system, few industrial conflicts, an ethnically 
homogenous population and a political culture built on compromise, full respect of minority 
rights and no known violations of human rights or liberties. Together with the other Nordic 
countries, Norway ranks at the very top in the United Nation Development Program’s 
measure of human development. Corruption by standard measures is one of the lowest in the 
world and politicians are for the most part seen as honest and benevolent. Ringen’s most 
interesting remark was that if it is not possible to get a system of electoral (read will of the 
people) democracy to work reasonably well in a country like this, then where on earth is such 
a system going to work? If this is what empirical reality looks like in rich, peaceful and 
homogeneous Norway, then what are the chances that this system of democratic 
representation will work to create legitimacy by introducing electoral democracy in countries 
like Iraq, Nigeria or Bosnia?  
Norwegian problems with democracy are not unique – the paradox is that while 
electoral democracy is hugely successful on the global level, especially considering the 
number of countries that have introduced some variant of this system and (not least) as a 
                                                 
6 It should be noted that the Danish Power study that was carried out under the same period as the Norwegian 
project came with a much more positive report about the status of Danish Democracy (see Christiansen and 
Togeby 2006). That two similar large research programs in two countries as similar as Denmark and Norway, 
using the same normative ideal about what should count as a good democracy, can produce so very different 
results is of course in itself interesting. Not all of this can be explained by differences in what has taken place 
during the last three decades in these countries. 
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 normative ideal, the citizens who actually live in countries that practice the system are less 
and less satisfied with its actual workings. Trust in central political institutions of 
electoral/representative democracy (parties, parliaments, politicians, local governments), 
appears to be decreasing in most established democracies (Dogan 2005; Holmberg 1999b; 
Pharr and Putnam 2000). There are also important problems in the central institutions of the 
democratic chain of command in the other Scandinavian countries (Esaiasson and Holmberg 
1996; Teorell 1998). In Sweden, the congruence in political opinions between the Members of 
Parliament and the majority of the electorate on a number of specific issues has been 
measured since the late 1960s. The result is not good news for those who believe in 
representative democracy. In fact, the congruence is far lower than a lottery would have 
produced (Holmberg 1999c). The results from similar studies of Germany, France and USA 
are not any better (Holmberg 1999a)   
Moreover, survey research in Sweden fails to show a positive correlation between 
citizens’ political trust and congruence between their opinions and those of their elected 
representatives on a number of political issues (Holmberg 2000). From twenty yearly survey 
studies on the degree of confidence that Swedish citizens have in various political institutions 
comes a truly puzzling result. Institutions whose leaders are elected -- political parties, unions, 
the European Union Parliament, the Swedish Parliament, and the city councils) generate less 
confidence than those in which citizens have no voice in selecting leaders, such as the public 
health care system, universities, the courts, the police, the social service, the Central Bank and 
the Royal Family (Holmberg and Weibull: 2007). Overall, Swedish citizens have greater 
confidence in appointed power-holders (doctors, professors, judges, policemen, central bank 
leaders, social workers) than in elected ones.  
The shortcomings of the established representative system for producing an unbiased 
or reasonably well-informed will of the people has resulted in some pretty radical suggestions 
for alternative models, such as the adoption of a “deliberation day” (Ackerman and Fishkin 
2004). Still, most observers would argue that proclaiming that the Scandinavian democracies 
(or other established Western-style democracies) are in a state of deep crisis and on the verge 
of collapsing is like crying wolf. True, political parties are not always havens for democratic 
procedures. True, Murdoch-style mass media offer no ideal for unbiased political information. 
True, private money plays a troubling role in many democracies. True, voting is lower than 
we would have hoped for. True, interest and lobby groups often play a dubious role. True, 
powerful bureaucracies have been known for derailing the policy intentions in the 
implementation process. The list can go on and on. In fact if, as Dahl (2006) states, political 
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 equality is the norm that underpins electoral democracy, and if this is to be understood as 
providing this system with legitimacy by ensuring that every citizen has the same chance of 
influencing public policies, then every known national democracy is (and will always be) 
light years away from realizing this ideal. At the end of the day, all this evidence about the 
failings of actual Western-style democracies leads us to ask if something other than the 
Rousseauian will of the people renders these governments legitimate.  
 
 
Minorities, electoral democracy and legitimacy 
 
To this point we have discussed the ample empirical research showing that even for citizens 
who are in majority electoral democracy does not work very well to articulate interests and 
transform them into appropriate public policies. Beyond this, the notion that electoral 
democracy in and of itself can serve as a vehicle for creating legitimacy appears to be 
mistaken. In all known democracies there are minority groups who know that they are never 
destined to become the majority no matter how many elections are held. For these minorities, 
legitimacy cannot derive from the belief that they will prevail in some future election 
(Przeworski 1991: 10-33).  Even so, many of these perpetual minorities do not rebel against 
their political system. Instead, in some cases they seem to thrive. To take a few examples, 
Finland has a spatially concentrated Swedish-speaking minority with a distinct culture that 
constitutes about six percent of the population. This minority has higher levels of trust in 
Finnish political parties, and is more satisfied with the performance of the government than 
the Finnish-speaking majority (Bengtsson and Grönlund, 2005).7 German-speaking minorities 
in Denmark, Belgium, France and Italy appear to be doing equally well (Wolff 2001). Ditto 
for the large Hungarian minorities living in Romania and in the Slovak Republic.8  
Other kinds of minorities are in a similar situation. Scandinavian voters who would 
prefer to live in a society with lower levels of public spending (such as the United Kingdom) 
have no chance of becoming a majority. In a recent analysis based on survey data from 38 
national election studies, Peter Esaiasson shows that there is surprisingly little evidence that 
those on the losing side of a national election decrease their support for the political system. 
In fact, in many cases the losers actually become more supportive of the political system 
                                                 
7 There are certainly cases where things have turned out at to be more complicated (the Quebecois, the Catholics 
in Northern Ireland, the Basques).  
8 http://www.htmh.gov.hu/en/index.php 
 9
 (Esaiassion 2007). This casts further doubt on the will of the people theory of legitimacy, as 
well as on the Schumperterian view that the main function of elections is to provide 
accountability.  
Thus in a large number of cases it appears as if electoral democracy is not a necessary 
condition for the creation of political legitimacy. In the cases I know best (Denmark and 
Finland), there is little support for the idea that ethnic and linguistic minorities regard the 
political system as illegitimate even though they can never hope to attain a majority and thus 
determine public policy.9 If so, what other feature of the political system is responsible for 
that attainment of political legitimacy? Obvious candidates include factors like minority rights 
and the rule of law, but I argue that these concepts do not go to the heart of the matter. To 
shed light on this, I discuss a recent example when legitimacy completely broke down, 
namely the outbreak of the civil war in the former Yugoslavia. 
 
The Counterpoint to Legitimacy – The Outbreak of Civil War 
 
The complexity of the concept of legitimacy makes it very difficult to operationalize and 
measure it in empirical research. Surveys are often used, but when a person states that she 
does not have confidence in a political institution, this is not necessarily a good measure of 
lack of political legitimacy. Low confidence in a Parliament, for example, may be due to (a) 
healthy skepticism of authorities that we often conceive of as a democratic virtue, (b) dislike 
of the current majority but not necessarily of the democratic system as a whole, (c) disdain for 
some recent policy or scandal despite support for the system.  
Another window on the causes of legitimacy can be provided by historical case studies 
of its breakdown. What counts as a breakdown of legitimacy is of course debatable, but that 
most people would agree that when large groups of citizens take up guns and start a civil war, 
this is a clear-cut indicator that something has gone astray with the democratic system’s 
legitimacy.10 By studying these events, we may discover the causal mechanism responsible 
for the breakdown of legitimacy. When it comes to newly-established democracies, recent 
empirical research presents us with a fascinating finding: the process of establishing electoral 
                                                 
9 I am focusing on ethnic minorities here. There are of course other types of minorities based on, for example, 
sexual orientation, social class and opinions. People who think that abortion is murder and should therefore not 
be allowed will in all likelihood always constitute a minority in the Nordic countries. What makes the minorities 
mentioned above interesting is that they also live in distinct parts of the country which should make collective 
action an easier task according to what Russell Hardin (1985) has labelled the logic of coordination.   
10 Or as one of my first teachers in political science, Torbjörn Vallinder, used to say: “Democracy is a simple 
thing. You count the heads instead of chopping them off.”  
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 democracy generates a considerable amount of political violence (Mann 2005). When citizens 
get the right to participate in reasonably free and fair elections and choose representatives 
who in due time will adopt policies mandated by the will of the people, things ought to go 
well. But this seems not to be the case. Often, the resulting political representatives are are 
elected to fight (Mansfield and Snyder, 2005).  
The civil war in the former Yugoslavia is a case in point. There are certainly numerous 
explanations for the outbreak of this civil war, ranging from those that point at ancient hatreds 
to the ambition of specific political leaders and the failures of the international community to 
intervene in due time. Other explanations point to specific decisions (or miscalculations) by 
specific political leaders. Some of the explanations point to historical and cultural forces that 
appear to have made the war inevitable The number of explanations is overwhelming and 
sometimes it seems as if there is a distinct explanation for each writer.  
In the following discussion I try to disentangle the sequence of events that led to the 
outbreak of violence. The analysis is very simple and inspired by non-cooperative 
evolutionary game theory. In such situations, people react to recent actions by the other 
agents, and their behavior – peaceful cooperation or defection by engaging in violence -- 
depends on their belief about others’ behavior (Aumann and Dreze: 2005). People base these 
decisions not on perfect information (which is virtually impossible to get in a case like this), 
but on whatever information that they can obtain. Moreover, they constantly “adjust their 
behavior based on what they think other agents are going to do, and these expectations are 
generated endogenously by information about what other agents have done in the past” 
(Young 1998: 29). A central part of this theory is that behavior is disentangled from basic 
beliefs. The agents’ behavior evolves dynamically as they learn about what the other side is 
doing, while their normative beliefs about the world (e.g. that it is best to live in peace with 
one’s neighbors in different ethnic communities) are not necessarily revised.  
This is not the place to give a thorough background of this tragic conflict. What I want 
to underline is an argument put forward by Michael Ignatieff (1993: 13), namely that in many 
respects this conflict was unexpected. First, this is because Tito’s policy from the 1960s to 
replace the various national identities with a Yugoslav identity was relatively successful. 
Second, since Serbs and Croats had similar languages and habits, they were “neighbours, 
friends and spouses, not inhabitants of different planets” (Ignatieff 1993: 15). There are 
several analyses of specific ethnically mixed villages that substantiate this (Gagnon 2004; 
Oberschall 2000). This is in line with Fearon and Laitin’s (2003) quantitative analysis that 
lends support to the argument that ethnic diversity is not a primary cause of civil wars.   
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 Third, Ignatieff argues convincingly that the conflict cannot be traced back to some kind of 
uniquely Balkan viciousness. The ethnic cleansing nationalism and murderous practices that 
had taken place during the Second World War in the Balkans were all imports from Western 
Europe and if Western Europe could erase these habits during the post-war era, the same 
should have been possible in the former Yugoslavia: 
Therefore, we are making excuses for ourselves when we dismiss the 
Balkans as a sub-rational zone of intractable fanaticism. And we are ending 
the search for explanation just when it should begin if we assert that local 
ethnic hatreds were so rooted in history that they were bound to explode into 
nationalist violence. On the contrary, these people had to be transformed 
from neighbors to enemies (Ignatieff 1993: 15ff). 
 
My interpretation of these events is as follows. First, Slovenia decided to secede. This met 
with some opposition in Belgrade, but since Slovenia only had a small population of Serbs, 
very little fighting took place before Slovenia was de facto acknowledged as an independent 
state. When Croatia desired to secede, it had a fairly large Serbian minority (about 11 percent) 
principally residing in the province of Krajina. This Serbian minority became worried about 
its fate in the new state, especially since the first elections were won by a nationalist Croat 
party led by Franjo Tudjman. Despite this, the Serb leaders in Croatia initially put forth 
relatively modest political demands; they had no intention of taking the Serb minority out of 
the new Croat Republic (Mann 2005). In a speech to 10,000 Serbs delivered in June 1990, the 
then most important Serb leader in Croatia, Jovan Rašković, stated that: 
The Serbs respect the Croatian people’s right to their sovereign state, but 
they (the Serbs) demand in that state an equal position for the Serbian and 
other peoples. The Serbs do not want a second state in Croatia, but they 
demand autonomy... The Serbian people in Croatia should be allowed to 
speak their language, to write their scripts, to have their schools (cheers), 
to have their education programs, their publishing houses, and their 
newspapers (cited in Silber and Little 1997: 95) 
Rašković’s claims were modest and in fact similar to those of the Danish-speaking minority in 
Germany and the Swedish-speaking minority in Finland. Thus the prospect that Serbs would 
be a permanent minority in a new Croatian state was not was not sufficient for these leaders to 
consider the new Croatian state as illegitimate. However, the newly elected nationalist 
Tudjman regime was unwilling to compromise with these moderate Serb leaders. Instead, the 
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 regime did five things that ignited the conflict and led to the outburst of violence in the 
Krajina, and later in other parts of former Yugoslavia.  
 
First, the constitution of the new state ensured that Serbs would be treated as second-
class rate citizens in Croatia. The moderate Serbian leaders’ demand that Serbs be defined as 
a constituent nation on an equal footing with the Croats was denied (Gow 2003:  44 ).Instead, 
the new constitution held that Croatia was to be a state for Croatians and that all other nations 
were to be considered as national minorities. Since the constitution of the Yugoslavian 
Federation regarded the Serbs in Croatia as a constituent nation of the Republic of Croatia, 
this important change “was a hammer-blow to Rašković. It strengthened the hand of Serb 
nationalists much more radical than he: those who wanted territorial autonomy, and finally, 
secession from Croatia” (Silber and Little1997: 97).  
Second, the Tudjman regime began to fire employees from government jobs merely 
because they were Serbs (Gow 2003; Oberschall 2000). These layoffs took part in the country 
as a whole, but also in the Krajina where ethnic Serbs were a majority (Silber and Little 1997 
Woodward, 1995: 107). "Massive layoffs of Serbs took place almost immediately after 
Tudjman's election, striking Serbs in the police, army, the judiciary and the educational 
institutions”(Udovički and Torov 1997:  94). Third, non-Croats were differentiated from 
Croats in yet another way: 
An official document called a Domovnica (a form providing proof of 
Croatian origin) was instituted and became an instrument of differentiation 
between Croats and non-Croats when it came to jobs and privileges. 
Opening a private business, obtaining medical coverage and the right to 
retirement pay, getting a passport or a driver's license, even in some cases 
being qualified to make withdrawals from one's own savings accounts - all 
these things hinged on the possession of a Domovnica (Udovički and Torov 
1997: 95). 
Fourth, from very early on (the summer of 1989), the police forces of the new regime failed to 
protect the security of Serb minorities “from vicious outbursts of anti-Serb terror in some 
mixed communities” (Woodward 1995: 107). It is noteworthy that these events took place 
even before moderate Serb leaders had made their demands. Thus, for the Serb minority, the 
new Croatian state showed itself to be a “weak state” unable to provide even basic protection 
(Fearon and Laitin 2003:76). Last, the Tudjman regime deliberately leaked information given 
to it by the moderate Serb leaders expressing their willingness to compromise and their doubts 
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 about more radical Serbian elements of the Serbian community. This delegitimated the 
moderate Serb leaders in the eyes of their own community. It also strengthened more militant 
Serb leaders in the Krajina whose aim “was not to secure for the Serbs autonomy inside 
Croatia, but to take the Serbs, and the land on which they lived, out of Croatia altogether” 
(Silber and Little 1997: 97). 
In conjunction with the delegitimation of the moderate Serb leadership, these policy 
changes carried out by the Tudjman regime sent a clear signal to the Serb minority that the the 
new constitution was not merely symbolic but would likely have very negative consequences 
for their life chances. The police could not be trusted to protect Serbs from attacks, no Serbs 
would apply when looking for government jobs, and they would encounter difficulty dealing 
with the new state’s Croatian bureaucracy because of a lack of necessary documents. 
The resulting violent conflict over the control of the police forces in the Krajina 
empowered Serbian secessionist political entrepreneurs. The secessionists mobilized support 
for their cause in Belgrade, outmaneuvered the more moderate Serbian leaders and received 
military support from the Serb-dominated National Yugoslav Army (Bennett 1995: 
Oberschall, 2000; Silber and Little 1997; Udovički and Torov, 1997).11  Notably, the 
Milosevic regime in Belgrade did not publicly recognize or support the self-declared “Serb 
Autonomous Province of Krajina” until after the first (two) causalities in a clash between 
Croatian police forces and the Krajina-Serb militia over the control of a local post office 
(Silber and Little 1997: 137). Serbian leaders in Belgrade did not protest against Croatia 
merely because the Serbs in Croatia were downgraded to a national minority. They only took 
action after the Tudjman regime made it clear that the Serbian minority in Croatia would be 
the victims of discrimination.12
 
Interpreting the causal logic of legitimacy 
 
The main lesson from this interpretation of events following the establishment of the Croatian 
state is that political legitimacy is more dependent on the output side of the political system 
than on the input side. As such, it is connected to citizens’ perceptions about procedural 
                                                 
11 This interpretation of the history of the outbreak of the war should not be taken as an excuse for the many 
horrible war crimes that the Serbian military and para-military forces committed during the war that was to 
follow these events. However, what the Tudjman regime initially did was to give the nationalist hate mongers 
among the Serbs all the arguments that they needed. 
12 Needless to say, I do not claim to have intimate or expert knowledge about the outburst of this tragic conflict 
(and as can be seen, I have to rely on secondary sources since I cannot read the Serbo-Croatian language). 
Furthermore, it is not unlikely that I have missed something of importance. 
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 fairness in the implementation of public policies (cf. Grimes 2006). In fact, the input (will of 
the people) side of the political system seems rather unimportant: after all, the Serb leaders in 
the new Croatian state were resigned to their new status as belonging to a permanent minority. 
As is the case for many other minorities, the Serbs in Croatia were prepared to accept 
Croatian rule if they were given cultural autonomy in the Krajina and a guarantee of civil and 
political rights. Not until this option was rejected by the Tudjman government did the Serbs 
change strategy from compromise and negotiation to violent confrontation.13 This 
interpretation of the evolutionary game that took place in Croatia explains why the 
secessionist Serb leaders could persuade the members of their community that their Croatian 
neighbors, friends -- and in some cases even spouses -- were out to harm them. Hence, they 
had better start fighting back. 
My argument is not that weak state capacity causes civil war (cf. Migdal, 1988). 
Instead, I suggest that a state that systematically departs from the ideal of impartiality in 
implementing policy will be seen as illegitimate. Logically, it is more plausible that a strong 
state can implement systematic discrimination against ethnic or racial minorities.  The idea 
that legitimacy has more to do with the exercise of government power than the access to this 
power by participation in elections makes a lot of sense. Your ability to vote is unlikely to 
have a clear and significant impact on your life chances: the likelihood that your vote will be 
decisive is, of course, miniscule. Many citizens voluntarily abstain from voting and from 
participating in other forms of political activity on the input side of the political system. 
However, if the police do not protect you because you are an X-type of citizen; if the fire-
brigade does not come to your house because you are a Z-type citizen; if your children are 
systematically discriminated against in the schools because they are Y-type children; and if 
the doctors at the hospital ignore you because you are a P-type person, then you are in real 
trouble. To be blunt, while what happens on the input side usually has little consequence for 
individual citizens, what the state does on the output side may be life-threatening.  Since 
Croatia had formerly been a semi-communist society, most social services and insurance, 
health care, and education were run by government officials (as is the case in most European 
welfare states). This magnifies the importance of the treatment of citizens on the output side. 
                                                 
13 It is not at all certain that the initial moderate strategy of the Serb leaders would have had a chance to become 
successful. Even if the Tudjman regime would have played along, using their propaganda machine, the 
Milosevic regime in Belgrade may have been able to persuade the Serb minority in Croatia to abandon the 
moderate strategy, not least as the Croatians did not have a very good “history of play” from the Second World 
War. However, we can never know this since the confrontational actions by the Tudjman regime against the 
moderate Serbs effectively prevented a peaceful resolution to the crisis and made the following confrontational 
propaganda from Belgrade look credible in the eyes of many Serbs.  
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 In sum, ethnic and linguistic minorities that are reasonably well protected against 
discrimination by government authorities and are granted cultural autonomy are likely to 
regard their political system as legitimate. However, attaining legitimacy in a situation like 
that of the Krajina is much more difficult. What the state does with respect to the output side 
affects people in a direct way (cf. Kumlin 2004). If this analysis is correct, then it is on the 
output side of the political system that the battle of broad-based political legitimacy is won or 
lost.  
This interpretation of the outbreak of civil war in former Yugoslavia is just one 
illustrative case.14 However, in a comparative statistical analysis, Melander and Öberg show 
that the occurrence of civil wars is not positively related to democracy, but to bureaucratic 
quality. They argue that the relation between democracy and civil war is u-shaped, meaning 
that such conflicts are most common in what they label as quasi-democracies.15 Using data 
about bureaucratic quality from 141 countries during the years 1984-2004,16 and controlling 
for a number of other variables (poverty, lack of economic development, time since previous 
conflicts, ethnic dominance and political instability, they find that bureaucratic quality is 
extremely significant for explaining the outbreak of civil wars (Öberg and Melander 2005). 
However, the causal mechanism they advance to explain the relation between bureaucratic 
quality and civil war is very different from the present one present one because it is not geared 
to the lack of impartiality and discrimination. Instead, they argue that bureaucratic quality 
increases the state’s ability to obtain good intelligence about potential rebels as well as 
advancing the government’s capabilities to distribute resources so “that each actor prefers to 
rebel” and to be effective in the implementation process (Öberg and Melander 2005: 9).  
Margaret Levi’s (1998) analysis of compliance to the demand for military service in 
Canada during the First World War offers further evidence that legitimacy is linked to state 
output. Levi shows that large numbers of French-Canadians numbers refused to volunteer for 
                                                 
14 Recent historical research shows that one can give the same type of explanation for the outbreak of the 
Spanish Civil war in 1936. The newly-elected Left government used the state to make lots of arbitrary political 
arrests of members of rightist parties, gave impunity for criminal action for members of the Popular Front 
parties, politicized the legal system in order to facilitate political arrests, accepted violation of property rights “en 
masse” etc. “by refusing to enforce the law equally and by intensifying its policy of harassment of the right, the 
time would come when many moderate conservatives would be willing to ally themselves with the radical right”. 
What drove many middle-class citizens into the arms of the fascist was the unwillingness of the Popular Front 
government to respect the ideal of impartiality in the implementation of policies (Payne 2006: 363) 
15 An exception is a study by James Fearon and David Laitin (2003)], but according to Melander and Öberg this 
is because they include wars of colonial independence, which implies that a number of Western European 
countries are coded as having civil wars during the 1950s and 1960s.  
16 Their data on bureaucratic quality is from the International Country Risk Guide, see: 
www.prsgroup.com/ICRG.aspx. 
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 the war. Moreover, Quebecois strongly opposed conscription. This is difficult to explain from 
a will of the people theory of legitimacy because the Francophone Canadian soldiers would 
have gone to war to defend France on French soil and thus would be saving the homeland. 
Levi’s analysis suggests most French Canadians believed that the Anglo-dominated 
government and army would not treat them impartially. Although there was no official 
discrimination against French Canadians in the military, “Francophone servicemen felt and 
were often made to feel uncomfortable” (Levi 1998: 149). One possible interpretation is that 
many French-Canadian young men may have thought that if they were to serve in army units 
led by Anglophones, they would be discriminated against or simply used as cannon fodder.  
There is also wealth of survey-based studies about the determinants of citizens’ 
satisfaction with democracy indicating that performance is more important than support for 
the will-of-the-people ideal (Diamond 1999: 192). In one comparative study based on data 
from 72 countries, Gilley (2006: 57) finds that “general governance (a composite of the rule 
of law, control of corruption and government effectiveness) has a large, even overarching 
importance in global citizen evaluations of states.” Another example comes from a recent 
study based on survey data from Latin America that concludes that for the majority of Latin 
Americans, “democracy was embraced not just as a result of belief in its intrinsic legitimacy 
or because of any ideological value but mainly because of an ability to deliver expected 
results” (Sarsfield and Echegaray 2006: 169). Yet another study that points in this direction is 
Seligson’s survey based analysis of the relation between citizens’ experience of corruption of 
government officials in law enforcement and political legitimacy carried out in four Latin 
American countries. Corruption of law enforcement officials is clearly a departure from the 
ideal of impartiality on the output side of the political system and this study shows that this 
type of corruption has a negative effect on political legitimacy even after controlling for if the 
correspondents had voted for the incumbent party in the last election (Seligson 2002). Thus, 
experiencing low quality government is more important for the decline of political legitimacy 
than being part of the ruling electoral majority. 
 
Conclusions and reflections 
 
If the representational system is democratic and public policies are decided according to the 
rules of this system, citizens will regard political decisions as legitimate - so goes the precept 
in mainstream democratic theory. They will do this either because they feel they belong to the 
political majority or accept that the majority rules until the next election. As this presentation 
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 has shown, however, this analysis of political legitimacy does not suffice. Instead, the main 
sources of political legitimacy are situated on the output side of the political system and have 
to do with the quality of government. It is the absence of corruption, discrimination and 
similar violations of the principle of impartiality in exercising political power that serves to 
create political legitimacy. The manner in which public administrations are organized is not 
just a question of economic rationality and administrative efficiency. In addition, citizens 
seem to have strong norms about what to expect when they encounter government officials 
that implement public policies. This argument is built on the fact that citizens generally come 
into contact with the output side of the political system - with the administration, that is - far 
more frequently and intensively than they do with its input side. Moreover, what happens to 
them on the output side is often of crucial importance for their well-being. One could say that 
the public administration is the political system - as citizens concretely encounter and 
experience it. The character of the administration is therefore decisive for the way in which 
the political system is viewed. However, my argument is not that if a country is going to 
democratize, legitimacy through impartiality in the exercise of public policies should come 
before free and fair elections (Berman 2007; Carothers 2007). Instead, impartiality as the 
basic norm for generating legitimacy on the output side of the political system is the 
equivalent of political equality as the basic norm on the input side. Respect for both norms 
must be considered to be central in a process of legitimation. If this line of reasoning is 
correct, it should have important implications in the efforts made from the industrialized 
world in promoting democracy in developing countries.  As the Iraqi case clearly shows, 
merely bringing electoral democracy to a country is not likely to create political legitimacy.   
The argument in this article has been that (a) political legitimacy ought to be the 
ultimate goal for any system of governance, and (b) there is very little evidence that that 
electoral democracy is the principal political instrument for the creation of legitimacy. Given 
the widespread belief in the superiority of electoral democracy, what accounts for its 
relatively minor role in creating political legitimacy? Let me very tentatively present three 
ideas. The first is that the introduction of electoral democracy can promote creates a political 
opposition.17 Simply put, it is hard to think of free and fair elections if there is no alternative 
to vote for. This has other implications. One of the most interesting things about communist 
dictatorships (and many others) is their inability to overcome the problem of succession. 
Dictatorships and other forms of authoritarian systems have a strong tendency to become 
                                                 
17 I thank Jan Teorell for this important insight.  
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 gerontocracies. The third argument also concerns the political elite. Any ruling group, 
whether or not democratically elected, sooner or later loses touch with reality.18  The reason 
probably is that, after a while, most systems of power tend to shield leaders from information 
(or to be more precise, the carriers of information) they do not appreciate to receive. For 
example, the Romanian communist leader Ceauşescu seems to have been convinced that his 
people strongly supported him at the very eve of his dismissal from power in 1989. When in 
1989 the Polish Communist Party for the first time decided to allow for competitive elections 
to the new Senate, they appear to have been convinced up until the eve of the elections that 
they would get a majority of the seats. In fact, they got none. The same appears to have been 
the case for Pinochet in Chile and for the Sandinistas in Nicaragua in 1990.19  My point is that 
democratic elections force political leaders to pay close attention to reality -- or to be more 
precise, the perceived reality among a majority of the population.20 Finally, elections may be 
good for the general political discussion and the education of citizens about public matters 
which, ceteris paribus, ought to increase political legitimacy. Politicians have to present 
alternatives, they have to argue for why their policies are better than their opponents’, and in 
some cases the mass media are said to enlighten citizens about the feasibility and moral logic 
of these alternatives.  However even in a stable democracy like Sweden, the empirical 
evidence that elections foster legitimacy is not overwhelming (Petersson 2006). 
 
                                                 
18 This idea comes from my many discussion about Swedish educational policy with AnnChristin Rothstein 
19 Thanks to Adam Przeworski for providing me with this information.  
20 In pure electoral terms, one of the world’s most successful political leader is the Swedish Social Democrat Mr. Tage 
Erlander how was Prime Minister for an uninterrupted period of twenty-three years (1946-1969). We he resigned as party 
leader in 1969, the advice he gave to his successor - Mr. Olof Palme – in his speech at the party was: “Listen to the 
Movement” (“movement” in this case being the Swedish labor movement). Thus, he did not say “do what the people want 
you to do”, or “be guided by the will of the people”. A reasonable interpretation of “listen to the movement” is: Keep track of 
reality.  
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